پديد آورنده :
فلاح، فرشاد
عنوان :
نش حل پذيري بازي هاي وضعيتي
مقطع تحصيلي :
كارشناسي ارشد
گرايش تحصيلي :
رياضي كاربردي
محل تحصيل :
اصفهان: دانشگاه صنعتي اصفهان، دانشكده علوم رياضي
صفحه شمار :
نه، 78ص.: مصور
استاد راهنما :
رامين جوادي
استاد مشاور :
بهناز عمومي
واژه نامه :
به فارسي و انگليسي
استاد داور :
غلامرضا اميدي، غفار رئيسي
تاريخ ورود اطلاعات :
1395/03/03
چكيده انگليسي :
Nash Solvability Of Positional Games Farshad Fallah f fallah@math iut ac ir 2016 Department of Mathematical Sciences Isfahan University of Technology Isfahan 84156 83111 Iran Supervisor Dr Ramin Javadi r javadi@cc iut ac ir Advisor Dr Behnaz Omoomi bomoomi@cc iut ac ir 2010 MSC 91A06 91A46 Keywords Nash equilibrium positionl games symmetric Abstract This thesis is based on the following publications On Nash solvability in pure stationary strategiesof the deterministic n person games with perfect information and mean or total e ective cost VladimirGurvich Vladimir Oudalov 2014 and Nash solvable two person symmetric cycle game forms EndroBoros Vladimir Gurvich Kazuhisa Makino Wei Shao 2011 In Chapter 1 fundamentals of game theory and its history are introduced and then we probeinto some basic concepts like the exact de nition of a game and also the so called Nash equilibria NE In Chapter 2 rst the positional games and its related concepts are de ned Next the e ectivemean costs and the e ective total costs computed from positive local costs obeying certain rules arede ned Finally an example of a 3 person game with positive local costs and without Nash equilibriawhich is a counterexample to Boros and Gurvich s conjecture 2003 is considered In Chapter 3 thecyclic game forms are de ned then as a special case the solvability of cyclic and symmetric 2 persongame forms are considered Also de ning 0 and 1 cycles paths some criteria for cycles and paths solvability are presented Finally the su cient and necessary conditions for the solvability of cyclicand symmetric 2 person game forms are studied Throughout this thesis the existence of Nash equilibria in pure stationary strategies in n person po sitional games with no moves of chance with perfect information and with the mean or total e ectivecost function is studied Such games are modeled by a directed graph digraph G V E whose vertex set V is the set of the positions of the game partitioned into n 1 subsetsV V1 Vn VT where the vertices in Vi are interpreted as the positions controlled by the
استاد راهنما :
رامين جوادي
استاد مشاور :
بهناز عمومي
استاد داور :
غلامرضا اميدي، غفار رئيسي
