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چكيده انگليسي :

Deception Modeling in Network Security A Game Theoretic Approach Amin Mohammadi amin mohammadi@ec iut ac ir April 30 2016 Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering Isfahan University of Technology Isfahan 84156 83111 Iran Degree M Sc Language Farsi Supervisor Prof Mohammad Hossein Manshaei manshaei@cc iut ac ir Abstract With the spread of malicious activities in the computer network organizations have been trying to find a mech anism to identify unauthorized activities deceive adversary and control network attacks Publishing incorrect informationis one of the ways to deceive attacker by the defender in such a way that an attacker with uncertainty about the accuracyof the published information distracts from his main objective this will reduce the possibility of successful attack On theother hand attackers in some cases plan to deceive the defender to increase their chances of success Despite all commondeceptive scenarios there are not mathematical tool to compare and predict the behavior of attacker and defender in differentnetwork Our goal in this thesis is to introduce deceptive modeling tool in the system based on a game theoretical modelbetween attacher and the defender We use a dynamic game with incomplete information to model the interactions betweenan attacker and a defender A class of the games termed signaling game are useful for modeling the interaction between at tacker and defender Since Nash Equilibrium failed to seize the idea that threats should be plausible we confine our focusedto perfect Bayesian equilibrium in a dynamic game of incomplete information In this thesis we present a comprehensiveanalysis of the signaling game and offer a feasible solution to find all the possible perfect Bayesian equilibrium Then usinggame analysis we provide a framework to model the deceptive interaction between an attacker and a defender As a casestudy two deceptive scenarios are defined and analyzed according to provided deceptive framework First case discussedin the security of cognitive radio We attempt to help the Secondary User SU in selecting its best strategy which is trans mitting its signal over the spectral band for detecting a deception or not transmit For this purpose we analyze the proposedsignaling game for finding the perfect Bayesian equilibria Our analysis determines for which probability of the transmitterbeing an adversary the SU should transmit its signal Second case discussed in network security We consider a situationwhere the fake avatar as the defender is uncertain about the type of a connected external user which can be a normal user oran attacker We attempt to help the defender in selecting her best strategy which is alerting to the system for detecting an at tack or not alert For this purpose we analyze the game for finding the Perfect Bayesian equilibria Our analysis determinesfor which probability of the external user being an attacker the defender should launch a defending mechanism Key Words Game Theory Signaling Game Deception Network Security

محمدي، امين

مدل سازي فريب در امنيت شبكه با استفاده از نظريه بازي ها

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