پديد آورنده :
فولادگر، مهدي
عنوان :
تحليل و طراحي مشوق براي بلاك‌چين‌هاي بدون نياز به مجوز از ديدگاه نظريه بازي‌ها
مقطع تحصيلي :
كارشناسي ارشد
گرايش تحصيلي :
مهندسي كامپيوتر
محل تحصيل :
اصفهان : دانشگاه صنعتي اصفهان
صفحه شمار :
دوازده، 91ص. : مصور، جدول، نمودار
استاد راهنما :
محمد حسين منشئي، محمدرضا حيدرپور
توصيفگر ها :
بلاك‌چين , نظريه بازي‌ها , دفتر كل غيرمتمركز , اثبات سهام , بخش بندي , پروتكل‌هاي با خطاي بيزانسي
استاد داور :
علي فانيان، حامد نريماني
تاريخ ورود اطلاعات :
1398/08/08
رشته تحصيلي :
برق و كامپيوتر
دانشكده :
مهندسي برق و كامپيوتر
تاريخ ويرايش اطلاعات :
1398/08/11
چكيده انگليسي :
Incentive Analysis and Design for Permissionless Blockchains with Game Theoretical Approaches Mahdi Fooladgar m fooladgar@ec iut ac ir Sep 2018 Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering Isfahan University of Technology Isfahan 84156 83111 Iran Degree B Sc Language Farsi Under supervison of Dr Mohammad Hossein Manshaie Dr Mohammad Reza HeidarpourAbstract Duo to the daily growth of the Internet and Internet systems data holders and producers power increases si multaneously Besides The centralization in data holding and internet systems administration is another importantproblem This centralization gives administrators the ability of censor Denial of Service data manipulation etc These concerns solved by introducing Blockchain as the core of a cryptocurrency named Bitcoin Over time Blockchain and Distributed Ledger Technology have used in many other applications It has re vealed drawbacks in the traditional blockchains such as scalability nality energy e ciency etc The existenceof mining pools also has produced some new issues on the centrality of blockchains Hence many new worksfocused on solving these problems in traditional blockchains We can classify these works in two main categoriesof Sharding based blockchains and Proof of Stake blockchains Unless Sharding and PoS blockchains have solved many blockchain issues they have not considered theincentive compatibility of their protocols We have analyzed these protocols and proved that there is no incentivefor rational nodes to cooperate while the rewards share in the way these works proposed Hence the defection ofthese nodes can lead the system to fail no new block added In this work we have analyzed new blockchain protocols i e PoS and Sharded blockchains and explainedtheir problem on incentivizing their users to cooperated Then we have designed novel incentive compatibleapproaches to share the rewards and guaranteed the cooperation of the maximum set of nodes However in somecases we share fewer rewards than the main protocol does with guaranteeing the cooperation simultaneously Key Words Blockchain Game Theroy Distributed Ledger PoS Sharding Byzantine AgreementProtocols
استاد راهنما :
محمد حسين منشئي، محمدرضا حيدرپور
استاد داور :
علي فانيان، حامد نريماني
