This study aims to investigate the competition among three modes of transportation—public transportation, Transportation Network Companies (TNCs), and private vehicles—using game theory. The significant market share of private vehicles and TNCs compared to other modes, especially public transportation, highlights the importance of analyzing the competitive dynamics among these three modes. This research employs a game theory approach and Nash equilibrium to eva‎luate the competition between public transportation, TNCs, and private vehicles for trips to the city center. While previous studies have primarily focused on the competition between two modes within a single corridor, this study examines the competition among three modes at the network level, which is closer to real-world conditions. The decision-makers in this study are considered to be the public transportation operator and the TNC operator. The public transportation operator, as a public or semi-public entity, aims to maximize a linear combination of its profit and consumer surplus. In contrast, the TNC operator, being a private entity, seeks to maximize its profit. The competition revolves around pricing, with each operator calculating its equilibrium price. The probability of passengers choosing each mode is determined based on a specified utility function, which in turn defines the demand and market share for each mode. Additionally, the study analyzes the effects of various policies, such as increasing subsidies to the public transportation operator, enhancing public transportation speed, implementing congestion pricing, and increasing the operational costs of private vehicles and TNCs, on improving the competitiveness of public transportation relative to private vehicles and TNCs. The analysis results indicate that congestion pricing is the most effective policy in increasing the share of public transportation and reducing the share of private vehicles and TNCs.

احمدرضا طالبيان

محمد تمنايي , شهاب الدين كرمانشاهي