رويكرد نظريه بازي در تحليل تعاملات تصميم‌گيران دخيل در قراردادهاي ساخت، بهره‌برداري و واگذاري زير‌ساخت‌هاي حمل‌ونقل ريلي

While Build-Operate-Transfer (BOT) contracts are pivotal for rail infrastructure development, the divergence of interests between the Private Investor (PI) an‎d the government, particularly in competitive environments involving road transport, poses significant challenges to contract sustainability an‎d efficiency. The core issue lies in elucidating how infrastructure physical characteristics an‎d government regulatory tools influence the PI’s operational behavior throughout the project lifecycle. By developing a Stackelberg game-theoretic framework, this research models the dynamics of the PI’s strategy selec‎tion within a dual market (rail-road), endogenizing simultaneous maintenance an‎d marketing decisions. Analytical results identify three distinct operational regimes, including Responsible (RES), Balanced (BAL), an‎d Opportunistic (OPP) strategies, bounded by critical infrastructure depreciation thresholds. The study reveals a “Marketing Cliff,” a phenomenon where, as the depreciation rate exceeds a critical limit, the PI ceases marketing efforts despite high potential deman‎d, resorting to the “safety valve” (Balanced) strategy to decouple profits from asset physical fragility. eva‎luation of government intervention policies suggests that in the “Golden Scenario” (low depreciation), applying pricing on the road competitor is more efficient than direct subsidies. Conversely, in high-depreciation environments, direct subsidies fall into the “Compensatory Subsidy Trap,” merely substituting lost revenues without incentivizing quality improvements. This research advocates that BOT contract design must move away from rigid approaches, calibrating regulatory parameters such as the concession period an‎d penalties according to the intrinsic depreciation rate an‎d competitive market dynamics.

محمد تمنايي

حميد زارعي

احمدرضا طالبيان , عليرضا صاحبقراني