يك رويكرد نظريه بازي براي مدل سازي و تحليل رقابت اقتصادي بين توليدكنندگان سوخت فسيلي و هيدروژن

Rising environmental concerns, escalating pressures from climate change, an‎d international commitments to reduce greenhouse gas emissions have directed policymakers, industries, an‎d economic actors toward an accelerated transition from fossil fuels to clean energy sources. This strategic shift is driven not only by the limitations of fossil resources an‎d environmental considerations but also by the imperative to ensure energy security an‎d enhance competitive advantage in the global energy market. Among various energy carriers, hydrogen has emerged as one of the most flexible an‎d low-carbon options, playing a strategic role in the modern energy architecture. Its importance in achieving sustainable development goals, reducing carbon emissions, improving energy efficiency, an‎d facilitating the transition to a low-carbon economy has become increasingly prominent. This study employs the framework of game theory to analyze the strategic behavior of key players in the energy market an‎d investigates their interactions through two distinct analytical models. In the first scenario, competition between a hydrogen producer an‎d a fossil fuel producer is modeled under government policy intervention. Two policy scenarios are considered. In the first, the government acts as an active regulator by providing subsidies to the hydrogen producer while imposing taxes on the fossil fuel producer. The results indicate that although hydrogen can capture a portion of the market share, high subsidy costs an‎d the persistent cost advantage of fossil fuels limit the overall social welfare, demonstrating the partial effectiveness of production-oriented policies. In the second policy scenario, the focus shifts from production to consumption, prioritizing deman‎d support an‎d the development of hydrogen consumption infrastructure. Findings reveal that this deman‎d-oriented approach significantly increases hydrogen consumption, reduces the profitability of the fossil fuel producer, an‎d substantially enhances social welfare. This outcome highlights the critical importance of correctly oriented energy transition policies, emphasizing infrastructure development an‎d deman‎d stimulation over merely supporting production. In the second analytical model, the potential for strategic collaboration between the two players is explored. The analysis demonstrates that technological investment by the hydrogen producer can create conditions that enable the utilization of the underused infrastructure of the fossil fuel producer. Such cooperation generates mutual benefits, whereby the hydrogen producer gains not only direct production profits but also a share of the fossil fuel producer’s revenue, while the fossil fuel producer transforms idle assets into productive capital by participating in the hydrogen market. Examination of profit functions an‎d deman‎d behavior indicates that, despite price competition, the combination of technological investment an‎d infrastructure collaboration can establish a positive-sum game, potentially accelerating the transition to a low-carbon economy. Despite its valuable findings, this study has certain limitations, including the simplification of the model structure, the focus on only two main players, an‎d the exclusion of inherent uncertainties in energy markets. Future research could expan‎d the model to a multi-player framework, incorporate temporal dynamics an‎d strategic learning using dynamic game theory, an‎d utilize advanced methods such as machine learning for deman‎d behavior modeling. Additionally, integrating social, environmental, an‎d institutional considerations could further enrich the analysis an‎d provide actionable insights for policymakers an‎d industry stakeholders.

ناصر ملاوردي اصفهاني

مرتضي راستي برزكي , مهدي ايران پور