In this study, the competition between the passenger transportation modes is modeled and analyzed by using a game-theoretic approach in an oligopoly market. The rival transportation modes are airplane, bus, and high-speed rail (HSR). The operators of airplane and bus modes compete with each other in the transportation market; while there is a potential operator for the HSR mode, who eva‎luates to decide whether or not to enter the market. The passengers are regarded as “heterogeneous” in terms of time value and the perception of service quality provided by the operators. If the entrance of HSR to the market is considered as a serious threat for the incumbent operators, then the incumbent operators can deter the entrance of the new competitor by implementing a barrier pricing strategy. In this situation, the two incumbent operators compete to maximize their own profits, while they cooperate to implement this strategy. Such a cooperative behavior among these competitors is called "coopetition". If this strategy is not implemented, the HSR enters the transportation market and an oligopoly market will be created. In this research, Isfahan-Tehran route is considered as the case study. According to the results, although the high-quality HSR provides greater values of consumer surplus, it also requires more government supports. In a long-term government policy making, the consumer surplus viewpoint is aligned with the net government utility viewpoint. In a short-term government policy making, the consumer surplus is in conflict with the net government utility. If the government tries to maximize the short-term consumer surplus, then it should specifically concentrate on the supporting policies that reduce the HSR’s operating costs. If the government tries to maximize the long-term consumer surplus, then it should specifically concentrate on the supporting policies that reduce the HSR’s acquisition expenses of rolling stock. The findings of this study reveal that if the passengers are homogeneous in terms of perception of service quality provided by the operators, then the operators do not compete to obtain market share. In other words, in case of passengers’ homogeneity, each operator either obtains the whole market share, or exits the market. According to the results, under certain conditions, incumbent operators are not only disable to deter the entrance of a new operator, but they also cannot even survive in the transportation market. In these conditions, our results indicate that pricing strategies are not solely sufficient for the incumbent operators’ survival. To address this issue, our results suggest that, they have to adopt non-pricing policies. However, if this investment is not economically efficient for the incumbent operators, they may prefer exiting the market after the entrance threat of operator HSR.

محمد تمنايي

احمدرضا طالبيان، محمد حسين منشئي